


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 44TH ENGINEER GROUP (CONSTRUCTION)
APO San Francisco 96233

3 August 1966

RILCA-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
RCS CSFOR - 65

THRU: Commanding Officer
9th Logistical Command (B)
ATTN: Staff Historian
APO San Francisco 96233

Commanding General
USARYIS
APO San Francisco 96331

CINCUSARPAC
G-3 Operations
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: OACSFOR
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

Attached is the Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 RCS CSFOR - 65.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
a/s

FOROTRD
660173

JERRY E. BRODSKY
Captain, CE
Adjutant

STATEMENT #2 USA

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FOROTRD

WASH DC 20310

AUG 19 1968

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 44TH ENGINEER GROUP (CONSTRUCTION)
APO San Francisco 96233

RILCA-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSFOR - 65

SECTION I

1. MISSIONS: The 44th Engineer Group continued its mission of providing construction support for the 9th Logistical Command. During the period, group construction units were heavily engaged in work on roads, camps, and various other facilities located along a 400 mile communications zone from the Gulf of Siam to northeast Thailand.

a. Projects completed:

(1) Shaping of slopes and final clean up of Bangkok By-Pass Road.

(2) Open storage area paving (Korat).

(3) In the Sattahip area, a 15,000' 8" pipeline and a 13,000' 6" pipeline were completed.

b. Projects carried over from last quarter:

(1) Sattahip Cantonment (9LC 66-14) a 1000 man camp of aprox 100 buildings and other facilities. Its fund limitation was increased to \$385,000. Began 10 Feb 66, now 61% complete.

(2) Sattahip POL Facility (9LC 66-13) a complete 50,000 BBL facility with fencing and lighting. The addition of a two mile (2) access road increased the cost to \$800,000. Facility started 21 March 66, now 96% complete. Access road is 75% complete.

(3) Camp Friendship Cantonment (9LC 66-2C) consists of 67 buildings costing \$180,000. Began on 15 April 1966, now 94% complete.

(4) Sattahip Signal Site (9LC 66-31) A terminal station with an estimated cost of \$20,000. Essentially complete except for an access road and concrete pads.

(5) Security Guard Regimental Headquarters (9LC 66-18) A 2400 square ft frame structure, estimated at \$8,000. Work was delayed due to lack of materials: it is now 50% complete.

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(6) Camp Pawai Special Forces Camp (9LC 66-16) Facilities for 100 men at a cost of approx \$20,000. Materials have now arrived and construction began on 28 July.

(7) Four-Man BOQ's, Camp Friendship (9LC 66-17, 17A, 22) Consists of 28 4-man buildings with utilities. Estimated cost is \$145,000. Work started 21 April, now 65% complete.

(8) USARCONTHAI, Hq, Camp Friendship (9LC 66-23) A headquarters building of 13,000 square feet, partially air conditioned. Its estimated cost is \$85,000. Construction began on 11 June, and it is now 93% complete.

(9) Korat POL Facility - Phase II (9LC 65-4) Consists of 6 permanent service buildings, hardstand, and drainage. Requires design, materials on site now arriving and availability of construction troops.

(10) Bangkok By-Pass Extension Road (9LC 65-3) A class 50 Military road from Korat to Kabin Buri. Requires 72 KM of new construction, 68 KM of maintenance. This project is about 65% complete. The effects of weather, deadlined equipment, and inexperienced personnel have delayed progress; the tentative completion date is now 1 March 1967.

(11) These projects were cancelled during the period:

(a) Cantonment Area West (9LC 66-12)

(b) Cantonment Area West II (9LC 66-24)

c. New Projects: The following projects were assigned to the group during the period:

(1) Sattahip Terminal Buildings (9LC 66-27).

Phase I (control area) consists of approx 5000 square feet of 20 x 48 buildings; Phase II consists of approx 1000 square footage. Phase I began on 1 June and is now 99% complete; Phase II will begin when contractors clear the area.

(2) Korat POL Drum Storage (9LC 66-30)

An open storage facility designed for approx 21,000 55 gal drums in racks; includes drums and access road. Estimated cost is \$10,000. Project is now 20% complete.

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(3) Thai Security Guard Facilities (9LC 66-36)

This project assigned the construction of facilities for Thai Security Guards at 13 widely dispersed locations. Construction standards are comparable to those US forces which the guards support. Estimated cost is \$190,000. Construction began on 18 July, and is now underway at 10 locations, with completion scheduled for 19 September.

(4) 31st Field Hospital Road (Korat) (9LC 66-35)

This is a requirement to pave a 15 foot wide access road with a single surface bituminous treatment at a cost of \$5000. Work has not yet begun.

(5) 809th Engr Bn Base Camp (9LC 66-37)

This entails the design and construction of a Bn (-) base camp near Sakon Nakhon, in N.E. Thailand. Materials are now being procured and construction is expected to begin in September. Total cost is presently undetermined; an initial sum of \$100,000 has been authorized.

d. Road Reconnaissance: The group mission to reconnoiter and publish reports on all main and secondary roads in N.E. Thailand is about 95% complete. Approx 650 Km of roads remain to be covered. In addition, CO MACTHAI has directed a special monthly reconnaissance of roads in the NE to determine the effects of the rainy season.

2. ORGANIZATION: (See Incl 1)

3. DISPOSITION: (See Incl 2)

4. PLANNING:

a. Movement of 809th Engr Bn: The most immediate and direct planning of the group concentrates on the movement of the 809th Engr Bn. On or about 15 August, the Bn is scheduled to begin movement from its present base camp at Phanom Sarakram to a new location in NE. Thailand (vic Sakon Nakhon), a distance of 400 miles. The scope of group planning includes the resolution of Bn responsibilities in its present locations, the actual movement, the construction of a new base camp, and the new Bn mission: development of the existing road from Sakon Nakhon to Mukdahan into a class 50 military road. Group supporting plans are directed toward guidance or coordination in the following specific areas:

(1) Completion of projects in the Sattahip area.

(2) Relief from contingency missions and "post type" responsibilities in the Sattahip area.

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- (3) The turnover of base camps.
- (4) Procurement of materials for the new base camp.
- (5) Provisions for mess, billets, and POL for convoys.
- (6) Rail movement of heavy equipment.
- (7) Intensified security measures.
- (8) Delineation of the new mission.
- (9) Administrative and logistical support in the new area.
- (10) The impact of this new Bn mission and location on the total capability of the group.

b. Other group plans and studies are directed toward the following goals:

(1) Improved forecasting of construction requirements within 9th Log Comd (B). A comprehensive projection of assignments which the group could expect to execute within the next 6 to 8 months. This capability can be developed by more effective liaison with Engineer and installation planners at other levels.

(2) Improved Staff Controls over all construction resources. Group resources can be more effectively applied by:

- (a) Improved forecasting, as indicated above.
- (b) A more systematic means of maintaining vital information on group resources and capabilities; a closer correlation of funds, material, manpower and equipment available for any given project.
- (c) The establishment of more realistic starting and completion dates.
- (d) A meaningful system of construction priorities allowing in effect, a "reserve" of effort which can be promptly shifted from certain existing projects to meet new and urgent requirements. Such a system would also permit more economical concentration of effort and more efficient control.

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(3) Improved job management and quality control. This is to be a joint operational engineering program aimed at the practical application of management principles at the job site. This program will require closer staff supervision and inspection and the development of "job site" and formal training programs to improve the performance of equipment operators and supervisors; further support of this program will be provided by a new Construction SOP, now being published, and an 80-hour operational and maintenance course now in session.

(4) A positive Safety Program: Aimed at sharply reducing the group record of 5 fatalities and 23 serious injuries over the past 12 months. This program will be effected through the following mediums:

- (a) Intensified command emphasis at all levels.
- (b) Accident "Case History" analysis to determine causes and prevention.
- (c) Integration of "Safety Engineering" into the above job management program.

5. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

The difficulties encountered during the period have actually prevailed for six months or more and are summarized below with their current status.

a. Constructions materials: Local procurement of the great majority of materials has been necessary. It has been a heavy demand, usually with short lead times, placed on a large number of small suppliers. The problem of delayed delivery time is compounded by tedious purchasing and contracting procedures. Specification and quality standards are still difficult to achieve. Recent and short term relief was obtained through CL IV supply, which received a shipment of aprox 1,300,000 BF of lumber from USARYIS.

This difficulty can be partially alleviated by:

- (1) More effective forecasting.
- (2) Closer follow up of local procurement actions.
- (3) Increased stockage of Class IV supplies.
- (4) Establish Bn supply dumps of operating stocks in small quantities of hardware, plumbing, electrical, sand, gravel, cement and lumber for hard to get items in order to meet completion dates of unforeseen projects.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
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b. Repair Parts:

(1) Experience has been that shipping times have proved to be unrealistic. All shipping times are in excess of those indicated for IPDs.

(2) Nonavailability of repair parts continues to be the greatest obstacle to full production. As an example; the 538th Engr Bn (Const) has a comparison of the quarter ending 30 April 66 and 31 July 66 for ASL's as follows:

	<u>30 Apr 66</u>	<u>31 July 66</u>
ASL Lines	1699	2174
Zero balance	879 (52%)	1253 (57%)
Reg submitted during period	8592	4172
Reg unfilled during period	6072 (70.5%)	3461 (83%)

c. Depot Maintenance: Excessive time is consumed by the Facility in Okinawa for material evacuated for depot maintenance.

d. Rotation & Replacement of Personnel:

(1) Personnel skilled in the operation of any type of equipment are in short supply. In all phases of operations, bulk filler personnel must receive further training and undergo extensive, closely supervised OJT prior to assuming full responsibility for operation of equipment. The EM's previous Army training is not used, skilled personnel must devote time to retrain bulk fillers, and the end product is often an individual who is not proficient in the new skill. Retraining is further complicated when these individuals become supervisors of new bulk fillers six to nine months later.

(2) Normal assigned strength may vary from 3% to 6% below authorized TOE strength; however, individuals are picked up on the morning report for a period before they actually join and after they leave the unit, therefore present for duty strength may be as much as 20% to 25% below authorized strength during the beginning of the Fiscal Year (the time of rotation humps) and 15% below authorized strength during the rest of the year.

SECTION II

Lessons Learned

1. Personnel:

The Group Rotation problem has been complicated by the increasing amount of bulk fillins in all MOS's. In every occupation from truck driver to supply clerk to maintenance specialist we are receiving men in a non-applicable MOS or individuals direct from Advanced Individual Training. The training of these men by their units entails a loss of efficiency while they are not performing their task to capacity, and a drain on the qualified men of the unit who must give up some of their time to train these new men. Currently no provisions exist for staffing purely overhead positions which arise from the maintenance of separate installations. A Table of Distribution would avoid cannibalizing the structure to fill positions such as club custodians, military policemen, PX managers, etc.

2. Operations, Training and Organization:

The major problem during the period was the failure to meet assigned or estimated completion dates. Where unreasonable dates are accepted and passed to subordinate units, there is a failure to recognize the group's true capability and to appraise higher headquarters of this capability or of the cost in additional effort required to meet the completion dates. A second cause is delay in the arrival of materials or equipment. The failure here is a lack of aggressive and thorough follow up on procurement actions and equipment available, with emphasis on items critical to the next higher stage of construction. There is also a need here for closer coordination between the S-3 and the S-4. The third cause is inefficient or poorly organized job sites. The need here is essentially that of job management training, closer supervision, and more effective leadership.

3. Intelligence:

There is apparently an insufficient Engineer intelligence effort or a lack of dissemination of engineer intelligence already available. The group could use data on most elements of terrain intelligence. The only significant intelligence activity apparent to group is the road reconnaissance effort previously mentioned. The assignment of an Engineer Terrain Detachment to this area should be considered. If terrain studies or special maps are already available through Army Map Service, an index of items covering Thailand would be most helpful.

4. Logistics

Construction Materials:

(a) Materials in sufficient quantity by commodity must be locally available or stocked in class II & IV storage facilities prior to the determination of completion dates and on assignment of construction missions to engineer troops.

(b) As a further expansion of the operating stock previously mentioned, the establishment of a depot stockage, of say 90 days, would reduce lead time and would contribute greatly to flexibility in employment of construction forces. This has the added advantage of allowing bulk purchases at more economical rates.

Repair Parts

Supply management techniques must be applied to repair parts requirements when opening a new area of operations. Consideration must be given to density of major items, type of usage and anticipated hours of operation, age of equipment and mortality of parts.

Leslie B Harding
LESLIE B. HARDING
Colonel, CE
Commanding

2 Incl

1. 44th Engr Gp (Const)
Organization-After 31 July 66
2. 44th Engr Gp (Const)
Troop Disposition-Present

RIIC-DO (3 Aug 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

RCS CSFOR - 65

HEADQUARTERS, 9th Logistical Command (B) APO 96233 4 August 1966

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters, USARYIS, APO 96331

1. The problem of obtaining construction materials has been a real one. Materials are purchased in country from all available sources; it must be recognized, however, that the business people in Thailand do not invest a large percentage of their capital in stocks. Consequently, small purchases must be made from many suppliers to acquire the desired quantities. To Contract for these quantities is, of necessity, a time-consuming process. Since the materials are usually required at times which leave insufficient lead time for the supply system to respond, it is necessary to utilize local purchase procedures. This headquarters concurs with the suggested solution in Paragraph 5a.

2. Reference paragraph 5b. The shortage of repair parts is command wide. All possible efforts are being made to improve this area of interest. Improved supply management techniques are being developed and applied and the installation of an automated system in the Class II and IV supply activity will greatly enhance the supply situation.

3. The shortages of skilled personnel mentioned in 5d (1) are, for the most part, world-wide shortages. Every effort is being made in the command to monitor personnel requisitions and shortages are reflected regularly on the monthly non-arrival reports.

4. The problem of picking up individuals on the morning report while in transit does in some cases cause problems. However, this is normal strength reporting procedure and is in accord with existing regulations.

5. Reference Section II, paragraph 1. Personnel. This HQ concurs with CO, 44th Group. The bulk fill program works a hardship on the receiving unit through the necessity of using key personnel to conduct OJT, and to supervise individuals concerned.

6. Reference Section II, paragraph 3. Intelligence. An Engineer Detachment Terr TM IK, is due in country in the near future. It's arrival should alleviate the problem cited in this paragraph.

1 Incl
44th Engr Gp Operational
Report for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 July
1966 RCS CSFOR - 65

Carl L. Duncan
W.H. MCKENZIE III
Colonel, CE
Commanding

RIC-MH (3 Aug 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
RCS CSFOR - 65

HQ, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, APO San Francisco 96331 - 6 DEC 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

This report and 1st Indorsement thereto have been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

a. Reference Section I:

(1) Paragraph 5a(4): Battalions can stock material at their own supply points and order small amounts on the basis of training requirements. Battalions cannot, however, order large amounts to be held on hand for unforeseen projects.

(2) Paragraph 5b(1): There were three surface shipments to Bangkok during the period 19 October - 18 November 1966 as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>M/T</u>
19 Oct 66	8,000
8 Nov 66	3,000
18 Nov 66	2,800

As of 18 November 1966, no cargo was awaiting shipment to Bangkok from Okinawa.

(3) Paragraph 5c: This statement cannot be refuted or confirmed due to lack of specific information and definitions. A message (RID-M 020437) was dispatched to 9th Logistical Command requesting a list of material evacuated and when it was evacuated to USARYIS for maintenance.

(4) Paragraph 5d: Shortages of certain MOS's within the 44th Engineer Group are recognized by this headquarters and have frequently been reported to Headquarters, USARPAC. The substantial difference between for duty strength and assigned strength is due to an average 10% of personnel assigned to the 44th Engineer Group being "in-transit" at any given time.

b. Reference Section II:

Paragraph 1: It is recognized that untrained "bulk fillers" are less desirable as replacements than trained individuals. However, this headquarters takes the view that bulk fillers should be provided to

RIC-MH (3 Aug 66)

2d Ind

- 6 DEC 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
RCS CSFOR - 65

fill required MOS spaces when requisitions would otherwise be cancelled or go unfilled; a bulk filler is better than no man at all. Area Support Commands have been established to offset the drain on TOE units in performing post, camp and station functions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



1 Incl
nc

G. F. WHITE
Major, AGC
Asst AG

GPOP-OT(3 Aug 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 RCS CSFOR-65

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

31 DEC 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with the basic report as indorsed with
the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 5d, Section I, basic correspondence, and
paragraph a(4), 2d Indorsement: Thailand Engineer MOS shortages were
reported by this headquarters to DA in the 1st Quarter, FY 67 Command
Summary Evaluation of Unit Readiness, 15 November 1966.

b. Reference paragraph 1, Section II, basic correspondence,
and paragraph b, 2d Indorsement: The need for the Area Support
Commands is recognized, and TDAs have been submitted to DA; however,
no personnel spaces have been authorized to date for these functions.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



1 Incl
nc

L. L. CHAPPELL
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

GPOP-OT(3 Aug 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 RCS CSFOR-65

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 31 DEC 1966

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
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no personnel spaces have been authorized to date for these functions.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
nc

L. L. CHAPPELL
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

44TH ENGINEER GROUP (CONSTRUCTION)
 ORGANIZATION AFTER
 31 JULY 1966



— NORMAL
 COMMAND

- - - - - OPERATIONAL
 CONTROL
 ONLY

44TH ENGINEER GROUP
TROOP DISPOSITIONS
PRESENT

561st + 697

809th Base camp
(vic Sakon Nekon)

①

538th
(-)

23rd

RTA

SB 772158

OR 075905

⑩

RQ 110805

Kabin Buri

QR 580217

Chachoengsao
Bangkok

809th
(-)

(Const)

Gulf
of
Siam

Pattaya

Sattahip

B (+)

809th

⑫

⑬

⑭

⑮

44th (Const)

697th (PL)
(Const)

561st (Const Co)

Korat

② ③ ④

⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧

C 538th

C 23rd
(RTA)

D 538th

D 23rd
(RTA)

PROJECTS

- (1) 809th Engr Bn Base Camp
- (2) 31st Field Hospital road
- (3) USARTHAI HQ building
- (4) Security Guard Regt Hq
- (5) Extension of Camp Friendship Cantonment
- (6) Four man BOQ's (28)
- (7) Korat Drum Storage
- (8) Korat POL facility
- (9) Signal sites TSG
- (10) Bangkok By-Pass
- (11) Camp Pawai Spl Forces Camp
- (12) Terminal bldgs
- (13) Sattahip Cantonment
- (14) Sattahip POL facility
- (15) Sattahip Signal site

INCL 2